This paper analyzes the impact of the Fukushima accident on the future of nuclear power around the world. We begin with a discussion of the 'but for' baseline and the much discussed 'nuclear renaissance.' Our pre-Fukushima benchmark for growth in nuclear generation in the U.S. and other developed countries is much more modest than many bullish forecasts of a big renaissance in new capacity may have suggested. For at least the next decade in developed countries, it is composed primarily of life extensions for many existing reactors, modest uprates of existing reactors as their licenses are extended, and modest levels of new construction. The majority of forecasted new construction is centered in China, Russia and the former states of the FSU, India and South Korea. In analyzing the impact of Fukushima, we break the effect down into two categories: the impact on existing plants, and the impact on the construction of new units. In both cases, we argue that the accident at Fukushima will contribute to a reduction in future trends in the expansion of nuclear energy, but at this time these effects appear to be quite modest at the global level.
Introduction
How will the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan that began on March 11, 2011 affect the future of nuclear power around the world? 2 There has already been a great deal of speculation on this subject, often based on wishful thinking rather than careful analysis. This is necessarily a counterfactual question and first requires us 1 The views expressed here are our own and to not represent the views of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, MIT, or any other organizations or individuals with which we are affiliated. 2 A good discussion of the timeline of events that ultimately led to the destruction of four of the units at Fukushima and the known releases of radiation can be found in INPO (2011) . We provide a capsule summary below.
to develop a "but for Fukushima" baseline for comparison purposes. Constructing such a baseline in turn is quite challenging since even before the Fukushima accident there was considerable uncertainty about the future of nuclear power in different countries and globally related to economic, technological and political factors that are each uncertain and vary from one country to another.
To keep things simple, for our baseline we rely on the 2010 and 2011 long term outlooks produced by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) that present reference and sensitivity cases to 2035. 3 These do not take the effects of the Fukushima accident into account and from this perspective do provide the kind of baseline that we seek. There may be better (and worse) forecasts available, but the EIA uses a model that we understand, clearly identifies the assumptions that drive the model and, overall, is much more transparent and objective than others that might be available. We will use this baseline as a starting point and then discuss how the events at Fukushima and a number of other factors may affect the future of nuclear power. Our discussion will be divided between effects on the longevity of existing nuclear plants and the construction of new nuclear plants around the world.
Nuclear power provides a large share of U.S. and global carbon-free dispatchable base load generation today and its continued growth is embedded in many forecasts for future global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Nuclear power accounts for about 20% of U.S. electricity production and about 13.5% of global electricity production today.
3 Throughout the paper, data on total electricity generated by nuclear power plants and total electricity generated is for 2008 and forecasted generation is for 2035, and comes from EIA (2011a) and EIA (2011b) . Data on the number of reactors in operation and under construction comes from the International Atomic Energy Agency's Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) on-line database, http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/. Data on license renewals and new construction licenses is from the websites of the respective national regulatory agency or industry association.
Indeed, one of the reasons for the much discussed "renaissance of nuclear power" is the recognition that nuclear power represents a potential source of large quantities of carbonfree electricity production for the future from plants that do not create the intermittency problems associated with wind and solar generating technologies (Joskow 2011a (Joskow , 2011b .
Accordingly, significant changes in the expected future paths of electricity generation from both existing and new nuclear generating plants could have significant implications for future investment in electricity generation and electricity networks and for the challenges of meeting aggressive targets for reducing GHG emissions.
It is still quite uncertain whether the accident at Fukushima and the associated releases of radiation will have significant adverse global effects on the continued operation of existing nuclear plants and the level of construction of new nuclear plants. It is fairly clear that there will be some adverse effects on the future of nuclear power compared to the "no Fukushima" counterfactual, so the question is how significant those effects will be. There are two potentially interdependent forces that could lead the Fukushima accident to affect (negatively) the future of nuclear power. First, the lessons learned from the accident may affect safety criteria and procedures for existing and new nuclear generating units. Such changes would likely increase costs for both existing and new nuclear units and perhaps delay deployment of new units. Second, the accident and its consequences may adversely affect public and political support for nuclear power.
This could lead some countries to move away from nuclear power for political reasons, make relicensing of existing plants and licensing of new plants more difficult, lead to tighter safety criteria, delay regulatory decisions, and generally increase the costs of existing and new plants.
It will take a considerable period of time to fully understand the events at Fukushima and what needs to be done to reduce the probability of this kind of catastrophic system failure in the future. We will not know definitively what happened at Fukushima from both technical and managerial response perspectives for some time (e.g.
whether and why the primary containments failed in one or more of the units at the Fukushima sites, the reasons for hydrogen buildup and explosions, emergency response procedures and their implementation, and differences in conditions among reactors at different sites and locations around the world). Exactly what the long run responses will be globally and how they will affect the economics of nuclear power generation and the politics associated with acceptance of nuclear power in different countries will remain uncertain for years.
Accordingly, we recognize that there are many relevant uncertainties that must go into our assessment of the most likely effects of the Fukushima accidents on future nuclear generation from both existing and potentially new nuclear power plants in light of what we know today.
What is the "Nuclear Renaissance?"
There has been a great deal of talk in recent years about a global "nuclear
What exactly are people referring to when they talk about a "nuclear renaissance? In general, we believe that this talk has been driven by a number of factors.
First, in the previous two decades, relatively few new nuclear plants were built around the world, and it appeared that except in countries like France, Japan, and South Korea there was little interest in building many new nuclear plants. However, in the decade pre-Fukushima it appeared that growing interest in and political acceptance for both existing and new nuclear power plants had begun to increase once again. In the three largest producers of electricity from nuclear power (the U.S., France and Japan), plans to extend the licenses and associated operating lives of most of the existing plants were proceeding without much political opposition. Prior to Fukushima, 71 units had been relicensed in the U.S. and 14 more are pending NRC decisions. 5 Relicensing had begun in Japan prior to the Fukushima accident; indeed Unit #1 at Fukushima received a 10-year license extension just a month before the accident. France had begun evaluating its nuclear units for 10-year license extensions, with at least one license extension issued in 2011. on Russia and a few other countries for natural gas supplies; (e) a new generation of nuclear power plants that were designed to be safer and were advertised to have low construction costs and the ability to quickly achieve high capacity factors to make them competitive with alternative base load generating technologies; (f) heavy promotion of these virtues by the major multinational nuclear power vendors and equipment suppliers; (g) announcements by some governments that had previously rejected nuclear power that they would reevaluate their earlier decisions (e.g. Italy, Spain, and Sweden) reflecting the above considerations; (h) interest of many emerging countries to respond to rapidly growing demand for electricity, in part due to assumptions that fossil fuel resources had higher export values than using these resources to generate electricity at home, and in some cases forecasts that domestic supplies of fossil fuels would decline over the coming decades. These considerations led to the expectation that the world was on the verge of a major new program to invest in a large fleet of new nuclear power plants around the world in the coming years, something that had not been seen since the 1970s and a global expansion of the countries operating nuclear power plants. Taken together, these developments led to a lot of optimism that there would indeed be a major "nuclear renaissance."
Talk is cheap. In our view, this purported nuclear renaissance was more hope or hype than it was a realistic forecast of the future of nuclear power even before Maryland between joint owners EDF and Constellation being the best publicized. The project in Texas led by NRG had made some progress in a state that had adopted a competitive wholesale market. Following the Fukushima accident NRG announced it had ceased all capital expenditures and wrote off its investment. TEPCO was one of NRG's partners and after Fukushima its ability to meet its financial commitments was in serious doubt. However, even absent Fukushima, the fate of the Texas plant was very uncertain due in part to economic considerations.
9
The only reactor actually under construction in the U.S. is TVA's Watts Bar unit 2 on which construction had started in 1972, was subsequently suspended in response to "need" considerations, and construction was only recently restarted based on the original license. cumulatively, with nuclear's share of total generation falling from 20% to 17%; in the OECD as a whole, nuclear generation would increase by 1% per year through 2035, 32% cumulatively, with nuclear's share of total generation constant at 21%.
The pre-Fukushima forecast in non-OECD countries was dominated by China's stated intention to build about 100 GWe of nuclear capacity by 2020. It also included plans by countries with existing nuclear power sectors such as Russia, other eastern European FSU countries, India, Pakistan and Taiwan to build additional nuclear capacity.
In addition, growing interest in construction of new plants was expressed by some developing countries which have no nuclear power plants, especially Turkey and countries in the Persian Gulf. This is consistent with the EIA baseline forecast that we There are several reasons for the significant differences in the nuclear baselines for the OECD countries (except South Korea) and the non-OECD countries: (a) electricity consumption is forecast to grow much more slowly in the OECD countries than in the less developed countries like China and India; (b) the construction costs of new nuclear plants in developed countries are turning out to be much higher than forecast a few years ago and they may be lower in developing countries-see Du and Parsons (2009) and EIA (2010b); (c) natural gas price forecasts have come down and supply increased, with the greatest effects likely in the North America and Europe; (d) the less developed countries are placing considerable weight on learning and internalizing nuclear power technologies as part of a broader development program, and at least in the case of Abu Dhabi, making a thoughtful set of agreements regarding enrichment, reprocessing, and waste storage to mitigate concerns about nuclear proliferation and control costs; (e) energy security concerns, primarily about gas imports; (f) commitments to large investments in wind and solar generating technologies, especially in Europe, which will reduce the net demand for conventional dispatchable technologies and make base load technologies less economical; and (g) the less developed countries have less experience with building, operating and regulating nuclear plants and may be underestimating the true challenges and costs associated with building, operating, and effectively meeting safety standards. The accident at Fukushima has already had significant indirect consequences, both in the form of lost generation at multiple nuclear units throughout the country, and also as a result of the evacuation ordered out to 10 miles from the site and the restrictions on transportation and food that have been imposed.
The Effects of Fukushima
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Pre-Fukushima forecasts of global nuclear generation over the next two or three decades were already under pressure for a variety of economic and policy reasons. In our view, the accident at Fukushima will not "kill" the much discussed renaissance of nuclear power, but it adds one more negative pressure on the rate of growth globally.
The questions are how much will these effects be and for how long will they last? Here we think that it is useful to distinguish between the future of the existing fleet of nuclear plants and construction of new nuclear plants. and strengthen emergency preparedness programs. Indeed, the NRC recently announced that nuclear operators employ a new seismic model commissioned prior to Fukushima to reassess the likelihood of earthquakes in their region. This may lead to costly retrofit requirements for some plants which in turn could make it uneconomic to keep them in operation if natural gas and wholesale power prices stay so low. As more information is gained from Fukushima, we can expect the list of recommendations and their priorities to change. It must be noted that the costs of implementing these changes as they affect existing and new plants are not included in the Task Force report, a subject to which we will return presently.
In the EU, the member countries agreed that all nuclear plants are to be subject to inspections, a set of stress tests, and the specification of a set of "lessons learned" from Fukushima. 14 The final reports from licensees on these stress tests are due at the end of October and final national reports at the end of the year. These stress tests have not led to any plants being closed for safety reasons so far. Of course, Germany and Switzerland took actions soon after the Fukushima accident which will affect existing plants. On South Korea recently reaffirmed its plans to extend the life of existing units.
China completed a review of operating units and announced some additional safety measures and a plan for a longer term safety assessment.
Any new requirements ultimately issued by regulators to enhance plant safety features and further reduce the probability of a catastrophic accident, will cost money.
Especially for merchant nuclear plants in the U.S. and elsewhere, the owners' decisions to continue operating or to relicense existing plants turns on a comparison of the incremental costs of adding another twenty years of safe and reliable operating life to the plants and the incremental revenues from the sales of power from the plants. If the cost is too high, it could lead some owners not to seek to relicense their plants and to close existing plants. So, whether or not the response to Fukushima has an effect on future supplies of electricity from existing nuclear plants will depend in part on how costly it turns out to be to meet any retrofit criteria that are ultimately required by regulators.
And the cost side of the equation is more relevant today than it was a few years ago when license renewals began because (a) for those nuclear plants in countries that have adopted competitive wholesale markets, the owners will not be able to turn to regulators to pass these costs through to consumers and (b) the revenue side of the equation has deteriorated. The revenue side of the equation has deteriorated for two primary reasons. First, forecasts of natural gas prices and associated wholesale power prices have come down significantly as low-cost supplies of natural gas from shale are being developed or are likely to be developed in the U.S., Canada, China, and Europe.
Second, many countries have adopted renewable energy mandates as components of their programs to reduce GHG emissions. This additional electricity capacity depresses wholesale market prices further and adversely affects the economic attractiveness of base load capacity with slow ramp rates. The more costly are the retrofitting requirements, the more likely it is that some existing plants will decide to retire earlier than is built into pre-Fukushima base-line forecasts.
Most countries with major nuclear programs moved quickly to perform short-term safety assessments of existing plants and to launch longer term assessments of regulatory procedures and safety criteria. And most countries are taking a more measured approach than Germany or Switzerland to making policy on existing a new nuclear units by first inspecting existing units to identify clear short-term safety issues at each site, conducting longer term assessments of potential changes in safety requirements at existing sites and potential sites for new plants and their implications (e.g. the U.S., EU, Japan and China).
These rapid responses of governments to the accident at Fukushima, assurances that operating plants are safe, and ongoing assessments of issues associated with seismic events, flooding, loss of off-site power, cooling spent fuel pools, venting of hydrogen released during a loss-of-coolant accident, emergency procedures, and other safety issues have helped to mute significant changes in public attitudes towards nuclear power in Decisions already made by Germany and Switzerland and the prospect that Japan and selected units in other countries end up retiring earlier than anticipated can have a significant effect relative to pre-Fukushima base-line nuclear generation forecasts.
Germany, Switzerland and Japan together account for nearly 20% of global nuclear power production. If these countries all retire their nuclear plants early or decide against license extension, the global nuclear generation baseline will shrink. Selected closures in other countries as a result of higher compliance costs or local political considerations will shrink the baseline further. However, we consider that it is likely that most reactors will continue to operate and be relicensed and the direct effects of Fukushima on the operation of existing plants will be at most 20% of current nuclear generation.
New Plant Construction
The EIA forecasts use the year 2035 as their terminal year. This is unfortunate and potentially misleading. Many existing nuclear plants (essentially all existing U.S. plants) will retire between 2035 and 2050, even if they are able to secure 20-year license extensions. This means that sustaining nuclear's share of total electricity generation, would require substantial construction of new nuclear plants well before mid-century both to meet growing electricity demand and to replace retiring units.
Turning first to the OECD countries with existing nuclear power programs, several countries where there was the possibility that they would build nuclear power plants to replace those that are retiring have now reversed course. These include Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Belgium (probably). The situation in Japan necessarily remains in flux, but as the country with the third largest nuclear program a decision to move away from nuclear power, together with Germany's decision would have a material effect on future trends. However, in the rest of the OECD countries with existing nuclear power programs-excepting South Korea, we believe that construction of new nuclear capacity would have been slow absent Fukushima. Any tightening of safety requirements resulting from the Fukushima accident will only make the economic status of nuclear power less attractive.
A potential exception is the UK, where a large fraction of the existing fleet of Magnox and AGR nuclear plants is likely to retire for economic and technical reasons.
Thus, there is a replacement market in the UK that does not yet exist in the U.S., France, etc. In 2008, the UK government decided to support building new nuclear plants, and that decision has, so far, not changed as a result of Fukushima, though the UK is participating in the larger EU review and this will delay pursuing new construction pending the outcome of "lessons learned" from Fukushima. 19 Three consortia have been pursuing construction of several new nuclear units (EDF-Centrica, RWE-E.On, GDF-Iberdrola) using modern light water reactor technologies.
However, the prospective new builds in the UK face significant economic challenges. The UK has a very large and heavily subsidized renewable energy program, and while natural gas prices are still high compared to the U.S., additional supplies of LNG, and pipeline supplies from Norway, Russia and Central Asia are coming on line, and shale gas deposits have been identified in England and other parts of Europe. In addition, England and Wales has the most liberalized wholesale spot electricity market in the world, with no capacity payments or long term contracts. This market does not appear to be conducive to investments in nuclear generation. In order to attract nuclear power investment the government is pursuing floor prices for carbon allowances and additional electricity market reforms are planned, including long term contracts and a capacity payment mechanism. 20 Nevertheless, in September 2011, Scottish and Southern reported that it was withdrawing from the GDF/Iberdrola consortium and would pursue renewable energy opportunities instead, though the other members of the consortium indicated that they would continue. 21 It has also been reported that RWE is re-evaluating investing in new nuclear plants in the UK. 22 At least in the case of RWE this decision is indirectly related to Fukushima, as the German government's decision to close its older nuclear plants immediately has had significant adverse effects on the finances of German utilities. It does appear that the UK government is going to great lengths to support nuclear power as part of its GHG mitigation strategy.
Of course, the economic situation confronting investment in nuclear power could change. Experience with the few new plants that are still expected to be built in the U.S.
and Europe may demonstrate that current construction cost estimates are too high (so far
France and Finland's experience has been just the opposite) and that optimistic break-in periods allowing these plants to achieve high capacity factors quickly are realistic despite the more pessimistic history-see Du and Parsons (2010) . Natural gas prices could increase again. Countries could back off of lavish subsidies and goals for renewable energy and energy efficiency programs. This experience will probably take a decade to accumulate. Thus, with the exception of South Korea, we do not expect a dramatic increase in investment in new nuclear plants in the OECD countries with existing programs in this decade, even absent Fukushima.
In the non-OECD countries the major action is in China, first and foremost, as well as in Russia and the former FSU countries in Eastern Europe, and the rest of Asia.
The post-Fukushima assessments have had little direct effect so far on plans to construct new nuclear units in the countries where significant nuclear programs were being planned prior to Fukushima. China did reduce its plan for new plants by 2020 by 10 GWe, but many considered the original 100 GWe goal for 2020 unrealistic and the reduction may have reflected considerations other than safety. Russia, India, and most other non-OECD countries are continuing as planned, pending additional information from reactor safety audits and more information from Fukushima. After reviewing the post-Fukushima situation some countries have now decided that they will not enter or re-enter the nuclear expansion business (e.g. Taiwan, Chile, Israel, Venezuela), but the impact on the aggregate global nuclear supply would have been small anyway. On the other hand, nonnuclear Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Abu Dhabi have recommitted to start building nuclear power plants.
We do believe that the countries that are entering the nuclear power business and those that are considering dramatic increases in nuclear capacity may be underestimating the challenges associated with these plans. China currently has 17 operating reactors with a capacity of 11 GWe. It has 26 units under construction and plans to increase it nuclear capacity by a factor of seven or eight by 2020. It is relying on two foreign companies (Westinghouse/Toshiba and Areva) and two Chinese companies (China National Nuclear Corp. and State Nuclear Power Technology Corp.) to lead this expansion. If there is one thing that we learned from the large expansion of nuclear capacity in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s it is that many unexpected construction and operating problems can emerge if the program is rushed, operates subject to constraints on the supply of skilled workers (like high-skilled welders, engineers, and construction managers) and does not build in time to respond to unexpected problems and to learn from experience. Successful nuclear power programs must meet economic, stringent safety and reliability criteria. We think that there is a serious risk that China's program is too ambitious to achieve these criteria. Given the expected rapid growth in electricity demand, the small share of production contributed by nuclear power today (2%) and under the plan (6%), its dependence on imports of fossil fuels, and its goal of reducing dependence on dirty domestic coal supplies, China may be willing to sacrifice on the economics in order to meet energy security and environmental goals. However, China cannot fail to meet high safety standards and this may prove to be a constraint on how quickly its nuclear program can actually proceed.
Countries like Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Abu Dhabi face additional challenges. They do not have the regulatory infrastructure, internal technical expertise, waste handling, non-proliferation, or industrial structures necessary to rapidly launch a nuclear power program. Indeed, one of the reasons they are interested in starting such a program is to gain and internalize technical expertise and some industrial infrastructure to help to advance their economies. Abu Dhabi has taken an approach that "outsources" most of what is needed to start a nuclear power program in all of these dimensions. It would be wise for other countries in this group to learn from its experience before moving too quickly.
Conclusions
We believe that the primary determinants of the future path of operation of existing nuclear plants and investments in new nuclear power globally continue to be economic considerations, perceived energy security considerations, environmental considerations, and public acceptance. We are surprised that public acceptance has not been shaken more by the accident at Fukushima and, if further lessons learned from Fukushima do not increase the political backlash, the same factors that influenced the future trajectory of nuclear generation pre-Fukushima are likely to continue to dominate.
We think that it is likely that tighter safety requirements will increase the costs of both existing and new plants, but aside from the countries mentioned which have or are considering dropping nuclear power as an option, no government has yet issued final new safety regulations or indicated that they will lead to dramatic changes in current safety criteria or large increases in costs to meet them. We will learn more over the next couple of years as current assessments are completed. So, it seems clear that the accident at
Fukushima will contribute to a reduction in future trends in the expansion of nuclear energy, but at this time these effects appear to be quite modest at the global level. The future paths for countries like Germany, Switzerland, and Japan will be affected significantly, but so far most other countries have not made significant changes in their support for nuclear power or adopted costly changes in safety criteria. In coming to this conclusion we recognize that there are still many lessons to be learned from the accident at Fukushima.
We close with one observation. After the accident at Three-Mile Island, and following the recommendations of the Kemeny Commission, the U.S. nuclear industry created an independent organization called the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to facilitate the sharing of best practices within the industry and to use peer reviews of nuclear operating procedures at each nuclear plant to inform senior management and boards of directors about the safety performance of the nuclear plants that they own and operate. INPO's reviews of plant operations are taken extremely seriously by U.S. nuclear operators and the INPO ratings of nuclear plants have become the gold standard used to evaluate performance and to initiate changes when peer reviews yield low INPO ratings. While the workings of INPO are consciously invisible to the public they are taken seriously by the industry and have helped to improve safety performance indicia for U.S. plants over time, applying a common set of safety criteria and the tough love of peers. All nuclear operators are willing to participate in this information sharing, inspection, and peer review process because they know that if one nuclear unit has a serious safety problem it can affect them all. INPO has played a major behind the scenes role providing the best information available about lessons learned from Fukushima and working with the nuclear industry to identify responses necessary to maintain safe operations for U.S. plants. If Fukushima teaches us anything it is another reminder that all operators of nuclear power plants and their regulators must take nuclear plant safety extremely seriously, harmonize safety criteria for nuclear power plants around the world using best practices and institute the kind of rigorous inspection, peer review and rating program that INPO has created. Senior management of companies need to be involved and hear from the inspections teams the good and the bad about the operation of their plants and be required to develop and implement remediation plans where necessary. While the international nuclear industry appears so far to have dodged being hit square in the head
